


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A SYSTEM FOR THE DETECTION OF MALICIOUS DOMAIN NAMES USING IMPROVED DEEP-LEARNING MODEL

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ABSTRACT

The tremendous growth of innovative technologies used for online services in the global economic space brings vulnerabilities to security breaches. The upsurge of these vulnerabilities created a level playing field for cyber-attacks to flourish, with assailants constantly adapting new nefarious methods to compromise information and deceive naïve users of the cyberspace. Despite the amazing and numerous anti-phishing approaches and solutions, the increasing incidences caused by malicious domain name system attacks such as spam, phishing and malware could be attributed to the dynamism in the approaches used by cybercriminals to counterfeit the techniques. To address these issues, many cyber security researchers have switched their focus to machine learning-based methodologies for malicious DNS detection. In this paper, we introduced the usage of machine-based model to detect the dynamism of malicious DNS by exploring Machine Learning, Ensemble learning and Deep-Learning. A customized web Crawler was implemented to extract URL attribute for model extraction. Furthermore, a Cross validation approach was used towards the classification and regression metrics (statistical approach) to evaluate their performance to an accuracy of 89.9%. Our experiment is based on both active and passive DNS analysis.

1. Introduction

The tremendous growth of innovative technologies used for online services and businesses in the global digital space brings along vulnerabilities to network security. A vulnerable network paves the way for hackers to manipulate and violate system infrastructure [1]. The upsurge of these vulnerabilities has created a level ground for cyber attacks to flourish. Often times domains that have previously committed suspicious acts are Black listed while the white lists include well-known and trustworthy domain names ([2]; [3]; [4]). This scenario is only used for broadly distributed infections rather than targeted ones. Attackers implant malicious programs (code) through the network vulnerabilities into host which grants them access to remotely control the host ([5]; [6]; [7]). The affected host then issue resolution requests, using a large number of nonexistent domain names randomly generated by the domain generation algorithm (DGA), a program that generates a large list of domain names and provide malware with new domains to evade security countermeasures in a short time ([8]; [9]). especially botnets ([10]; [11]). Some identified problems are limitations of conventional approaches used by many for malicious domain detection.

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According to [12], these approaches are blacklisting of domain names, Malicious domain name (MDN) attack is a persisting problem in domain name system (DNS). Several researchers assert the fact that more work should be done and direction should be focused on the attacks analysis of the network traffic, dissection of the webpage content, DNS traffic analysis, and analysis of salient lexical features. The non-consideration of the domain name and the DGA data for computing the maliciousness of the URL results in a lack of precision. Hence, they advised effective mechanisms for malicious domain detection to help improve the precision of malicious URL detection using algorithm features selection and dynamic machine learning models that can act passively and actively in detecting malicious DNS; making use of Deep Learning algorithms to detect malicious accounts based on domain names to blacklisting associated Ips.

This paper aim therefore is to design a malicious name detection model using a data-centric methodology, to implement and train the proposed model using a DGA dataset and to validate the model performance using classification metrics (Accuracy, Precision, F1-score and Recall) or regression metrics (RMSE, MSE), to operationalize best performance model in a web browser.

2. RELATED WORKS

The DNS has been increasingly used by attackers to maintain and manage their materials infrastructure. Generally, malicious detection systems employ various approaches to investigate and establish the protected DNS environment. The verification of malicious DNS using multiple features can also be described in different dimension, in order to distinguish legitimate and malicious domains. A detection technology based on the passive domain name analysis method was proposed in [5] where a technique called EXPOSURE was used to train and monitor the DNS traffic of a commercial ISP. Several types of features were extracted by the researchers including the domain name lifetime, period similarity number of accesses; number of IPs parsed, whether IP is shared by other domain names, digital symbol ratio and length of longest meaningful substring. However, a classifier was constructed using decision tree algorithm.

A botnet detection algorithm basedon DNS traffic features using Power Spectral Density (PSD) testing technology which detects MDNs by analyzing malicious behavior within large volumes of DNS trafficwas proposed in [13]. A DGA classifier that leveraged long short-term memory (LSTM) networks for real-time production of DGA's without the need for contextual information or manually created features was also developed [14]. The experimental result showed that the method was significantly better than some state-of-the-art techniques. To obtained the data for the study of Local DNS records, [15] investigated the performance of various DL algorithms such as RRN, LSTM, and other approaches in which LSTM performed best in identifying malicious DNS requests. AnMDNs detection algorithm based on Algorithmically generated domain was developed using cluster correlation that identifies the names generated by a domain generation algorithm or its variants [16]. Various features such as TTL, the distribution of IP Addresses; WHOIS features, and historical information from the domain names in each cluster were extracted and the Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm was used to identify the MDNs.

Using Deep Learning (DL) approaches for the recognition of fraudulent domain names [17] extracted textual characteristics from domain names and passing them to LSTM and bidirectional LSTM. In another instance, [12] introduced selected features such as blacklist domain names features, DNS based features, web-based features and lexical features to identify malicious domain through features extracted from domain names. In a study, [18] aim to use a new metric to evaluate real unbalanced traffic data. Their experimental result shows that the level of the precision model and the value of the area under the curve (AUC) reach a certain maximum height. In [19], a system was developed that detected the feasibility of MDN account in relation to block chain so as to know whether it is malicious or not. They also use numerous features such as DN string based, DNS query based, DNS graph based and temporal aspect based extracted from domain names.

3. METHODOLOGY

Our proposed approach is based on three features which we extract from domain name online repository categorizing them into three groups; lexical-based, DNS statistical-based and third party-based features.

3.1 Lexical-based features

The lexical features ensure that MDNs can be detected using various features. In this work, we have extracted fourteen features from each domain details as represented in table 1:

Table 1: List of DNS-based features

| Feature | Feature name | Description |
|----------------|-------------------------|---|
| 0 | DNS_ID | Identifier of the DNS |
| Lexical | | |
| 1 | Subdomain | Has sub-domain or not |
| 2 | TLD | Top-level domain |
| 3 | SLD | Second-level domain |
| 4 | Len | Length of domain and subdomain |
| 5 | Numeric percentage | Counts the number of digits in the domain and subdomain |
| 6 | Character distribution | Counts the number of each letter in the domain |
| 7 | Entropy | Entropy of letter distribution |
| 8 | 1-gram | 1-gram of the domain in letter level |
| 9 | 2-gram | 2-gram of the domain in letter level |
| 10 | 3-gram | 3-gram of the domain in letter level |
| 11 | Longest word | Longest meaningful word in SLD |
| 12 | Distance from bad words | Computes average distance from bad words |
| 13 | Typos | Typosquatting |
| 14 | Obfuscation | Max value for URL obfuscation |

3.2 DNS Statistical-Based Features

Statistical-based features were extracted based on the arrangement of DNS information in a distinct casement. However, these types of features are statistical information evaluated from the line section of the DNS feedback. Seven features were extracted from each domain as shown in in table 2.

Table 2: List of DNS statistical-based features

| DNS statistical | | |
|------------------------|----------------|--|
| 1 | Unique country | The number of distinct country names in the window |
| 2 | Unique ASN | The number of distinct ASN values in the window |
| 3 | Unique TTL | The number of distinct TTL values in the window |
| 4 | Unique IP | The number of distinct IP values in the window |
| 5 | Unique domain | The number of distinct domain values in the window |
| 6 | TTL means | The average TTL in the window |
| 7 | TTL variance | The variance of TTL in the window |

3.3 Third-party Features

Twelve features of the third party were extracted from two sources; WHOIS and Alexa rank. They contain the biographical properties of a domain as shown the table 3.

Table 3: Third-party Features Extracted

| | | |
|----|--------------------|---|
| 1 | Domain name | Name of the domain |
| 2 | Registrar | Registrar of the domain |
| 3 | Registrant name | The name of the domain has been registered |
| 4 | Creation date time | The date and time the domain created |
| 5 | Emails | The emails associated with a domain |
| 6 | Domain age | The age of a domain |
| 7 | Organization | What organization it is linked to |
| 8 | State | The state the main branch is |
| 9 | Country | The country where the main branch is |
| 10 | Name server count | The total number of name servers linked to the domain |
| 11 | Alexa rank | The rank of the domain by Alexa |
| 12 | Status | The class of the DNS-Benign or Malicious |

The software methodology adopted in this study is the Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM). The CRISP-DM is both an industry-proven methodology and a process model. As an industry methodology, it provides a concrete description of typical project stages tasks associated with each stage as well as the details of the interrelationship between the various tasks. As a process model, it provides a sketch that shows the data mining. In this study, CRISP-DM undergoes five stages include; (i) Business and data understanding, (ii) Data preparation, (iii) Modeling, (iv) Evaluation, and (v) Deployment. Figure 1 shows the proposed architecture, adopting the CRISP-DM methodology.




Figure 1: Proposed Malicious DNS prediction system

3.4 Data Preparation (DNS Dataset Description)



The CICBellDNS2021 was extracted at the Canadian Institute for Cyber security. The dataset comprises malware, spam, phishing, and benign URLs stored in separate comma-separated value (CSV) files (See table 4). The Correlation Matrix Analysis and Principal Component Analysis were then introduced to determine the relationship that exist among features in the dataset so that the most highly correlated features with predictor will be considered relevant for model building.

Table 4: Statistics of the domains dataset

| Category | Original domains | Domains processed | Packets processed | Size in megabytes |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Malware | 26,895 | 9,432 | 182,266 | 2.7 |
| Spam | 8,254 | 1,976 | 61,046 | 2.4 |
| Phishing | 16,307 | 12,586 | 95,492 | 2.8 |
| Benign | 988,667 | 500,000 | 6,907,719 | 266 |

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Figure 2 shows the datasets consisting of 16 attributes. Some features were not correlated, these features were dropped to improve model performance. Hence, a total of 16 predictor features and one target feature (status) were used in the dataset for the model-building phase. For the model to perform better, the epoch value was increased from 5 to 10 as shown in figure 2. Figure 3 shows that all 16 features extracted from the 16 features of the data preprocessing significantly contribute to the variance in the dataset, hence they were used for model training with the help of Epoch values to determine the number of iterative or training that the model will perform.

**Figure 2: Correlation Matrix for dataset****Figure 3: PCA diagram at 0.95% for dataset**

4.1 Model Evaluation and Performance

Using the testing dataset, the trained models were evaluated. The models predict the labels of the test samples, which are then compared to the true labels to determine their performance. The evaluation of various models were conducted using several performance and validity metrics. We only focus on 5-fold cross validation classification and regression metrics. In table 5 shows the mean of the model's 5-fold cross validation classification metrics. In the EL models categories, RF had the highest accuracy of 89.9%. In ML models, DT had the highest accuracy of 86.9%. In the DL models, GRU had the highest accuracy score of 77.2%. Hence, RF (Ensemble Learning) had the highest accuracy score of 89.9% at 5-fold cross validation approach and was considered appropriate for the best detection model for predicting malicious DNS.

Table 5: Model Regression Metric using 5-fold cross validation approach

| Algorithm | R ² | MSE | RMSE |
|-----------|----------------|------|------|
| DT | 0.48 | 0.13 | 0.36 |
| LogR | -0.38 | 0.34 | 0.59 |
| SVM | -0.38 | 0.34 | 0.59 |
| ANN | -0.36 | 0.34 | 0.58 |
| KNN | 0.41 | 0.15 | 0.38 |
| RF | 0.60 | 0.10 | 0.32 |
| Xgboost | 0.34 | 0.16 | 0.41 |
| MLP | -0.08 | 0.27 | 0.52 |
| DNN | -0.10 | 0.27 | 0.52 |
| GRU | 0.08 | 0.23 | 0.48 |
| LSTM | -0.05 | 0.26 | 0.51 |

For the root mean square error, we choose the best model by identifying the least value in the evaluation metrics. Hence, in the EL models categories; RF had the lowest RMSE of 0.60. In ML models, DT had the lowest RMSE of 0.48. In the DL models, GRU had the lowest RMSE of 0.08. Hence, GRU has the least error rate and it is considered best for the detection of malicious DNS in terms of reduce error rate of detecting malicious DNS.

5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This study demonstrates the development of three modeling approaches for detecting malicious DNS with the ability to quantify the uncertainty in the prediction or detection. The modeling approach consists of various classifiers which were evaluated in order to select for the best performance. Also, the models were evaluated using 5-fold cross-validation to ensure that they were exposed to all data and to detect potential over-fitting a procedure frequently used within. The models obtained produce a good fit of the experimental data with an accuracy of 89.9%.

In our future work, we hope to optimize the best selected models for real-time malicious DNS detection by implementing it as a web browser plugin in and also to use another combine models for accuracy performance.

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